Sandra Lapointe and Christopher Pincock, eds. *Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy*. Palgrave Macmillan 2017. xix + 365 pp. 93,59 €. (Hardcover ISBN 978-1-137-40807-5).

Sandra Lapointe and Christopher Pincock have edited an interesting volume on *Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy*: the book will provide important insights about the historical sources and problematic of the so-called analytic group, though it is hardly more than a usual collection of nice essays about a broad topic.

The book was published in Palgrave Macmillan's "Innovations in Philosophy" series that aims at bringing forward original research about "hot topics" and "emerging areas" (p. v.). The editors confirm that their idea was to get together young scholars who contributed already much to the newly emerged field of "history of analytic philosophy." Their choices of contributors are entirely justified and the topic is indeed a relative newbie. However, one thing should be noted at the beginnings.

The title – *Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy* – might suggest to the reader that "innovations" *in* the history of analytical philosophy will be dealt with in the volume. By overcoming the tautological overtones of the previous sentence, one might expect chapters about the various innovations that characterized analytic philosophy in the twentieth century: such methods, notions, concepts, and ideas that were constructed by analytic philosophers in order to solve or dissolve traditional problems and difficulties. If you open the book explicitly with *that* goal in mind, you might be disappointed. Nonetheless, what the reader gets is still interesting and important, and such a reading/narrative will be given here that still justifies somehow partially our expectations based on the title of the volume.

After a longer introduction (comparing some recent historiographies), the book divides into four major parts, namely "Aspects of Analytic Philosophy", "Logic and Language", "Ontology and Mind", and finally "Mathematics", thus representing all the customary major divisions of analytic philosophy. I will go through all of them, emphasizing their merits and disadvantages as well.

Greg Frost-Arnold aims to reconstruct and contextualize the usage of the term 'analytic philosophy'. His approach is quite interesting: given the fact that many of the current investigations into the nature and definition of analytic philosophy broke down after a while, Frost-Arnold chooses a by-pass road to approach his subject. If analytic philosophy dodges all the direct and linear approaches, a more contextual and historical approach should be followed, "focusing […] upon an issue that may be more tractable: the rise of the *category* or *label* 'analytic philosophy'" (28). He shows that the term (or closely related ones) was not used widely until the 1950s (despite its first relevant appearance in the early 1930s); this is explained by the fact that one of the most important elements of the term ('linguistic analysis') was not shared by everyone that *should* be grouped together under our umbrella term ('analytic philosophy').

Though important elements of his general narrative (the status of the linguistic turn, and the constructive element in building up a tradition by using a vexed term for various groups) were put on the table already by others (especially, e.g., by Aaron Preston), it is undeniably true that Frost-Arnold did a detailed work both on the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the problem.

The second paper in the first section was written by Catarina Dutilh Novaes and Leon Geerdink about "The Dissonant Origins of Analytic Philosophy." The paper is indeed a historical one having in mind the aim to show something about our present as well. The authors claim that a certain tension, that was present at the birth of analytic philosophy, is still haunting contemporary philosophers and comes to the surface in their debates. What did the authors have in mind? Well, they claim that early analytic philosophy was characterized by

the duality of methods, namely, there were those who relied on common sense and intuitions, and there were those whose "methods [relied] extensively on formal, mathematical tools, and/or operating in close proximity with the empirical and exact sciences" (70). Dutilh Novaes and Geerdink rightly point out that the philosophy of Moore and Russell more or less corresponds to the mentioned division, but this is not "anything very novel so far" as they admit (70). What should give a peculiar twist to their paper is the idea that how Moore and Russell differed in their attitudes towards the "analysandum" in their philosophical practice, and how that differentiation exemplifies itself in the current literature as well.

Dutilh Novaes and Geerdink seem to be right about what they say regarding the different methodologies both in former and in current analytic philosophy. But they are not just right; they are obviously right in the sense that their narrative was in usage for decades (ideal language philosophy vs. ordinary language philosophy; naturalism and voluntarism, etc.), and only their specific terminology seems to be innovative: they talk about *conservative* and *transformative/revisionary* attitudes towards common sense belief. They distillate these attitudes from the cases of Moore and Russell, though they also devote pages to show that Moore and Russell exemplify what they dubbed, respectively, as the conservative and revisionary attitudes.

Moving on from the explicitly historical papers to the "Logic and Language" section, we got, in fact, three more historically aimed articles. Besides having what seems to be a necessary element in any volume on analytic philosophy, namely an inevitable paper on Wittgenstein – (this time by Colin Johnston) that is actually a nice summary of two interconnected topics of the *Tractatus* (representability and possibility) with some critical remarks on the literature – we have one paper on Russell, and one on the history of semantics.

Lydia Patton's essay is one of the best in the volume. She provides a really nice and organized context for the ideas of the early Russell. Patton starts from Henry Sheffer's (wrongly indicated in the paper as "Harry Sheffer") famous so-called "logocentric predicament." Sheffer claimed in the review of *Principia Mathematica's* second edition that there might be a certain circularity with regard the universality of logic: namely that we need to presuppose logic in order to account for the nature of logic. Patton reconstructs from this observation the nature of Russell's method (in order to motivate and maintain logicism) that had, or presumably had important nineteenth-century sources.

By discussing the special views of William Stanley Jevons and John Venn, Patton points out that there was a long-standing tradition of invoking regressive methods. The idea was that certain consequences or facts are to be justified regressively, namely, that the solution for the question of what axioms and rules are we supposed to accept should be based on the process whether their consequences match those statements that we already accepted. This is not a usual deduction: we are simply deducing certain consequences in an axiomatic structure; rather with some ingenuity and contingency, we have to *find out* and *use* the axioms in order to get closer to the required results. I called this approach elsewhere ("The Limits and Basis of Logical Tolerance: Carnap's Combination of Russell and Wittgenstein," in Peter Stone (ed.), *Bertrand Russell: Life and Legacy*, Vernon Press, 2017) as an 'inductive-practical' method that consist in inductive considerations – and thus admits a sort of fallibility – and practical conceptions, admitting external values and aims. After all, what we find in this chapter entirely matches what is promised in the book's title: Russell re-invented an already known and widely used method in an entirely new setting and for very special purposes (logicism), that turned out to be one of the characteristic marks of early analytic philosophy.

The final paper in this part is devoted to an insufficiently discussed topic, namely the history of semantics, and for that reason, it might bear of special importance. Daniel W. Harris writes about 'the history and prehistory of natural-language semantics', and his general and broad narrative is a bit similar to the second chapter's (of Dutilh Novaes and Geerdink);

namely that many of its elements are well-known and too abstract. We got the usual story of Frege, Tarski, and Carnap as forerunners of idealizations in the philosophy of language as providing a form (or precursory version) of truth-conditional semantics, and how the developments in the late twentieth century made these approaches old-fashioned and promising but dusty. The problem is that the paper could have been more written more tightly by omitting the textbook-like passages at the beginning and concentrating more on the idea of how ideologies were masking the intentions and methods of scholars (172). On the other hand, it is not entirely clear how and why are philosophers (like Carnap) are always contrasted with the achievements of first-order theoretical linguists. Though there are obvious continuities between the fields of philosophy of language and logic and theoretical linguistics, it is not at all evident that the results of those who explicitly practiced the former could be compared with the results of more focused linguists.

Moving on to the third part of the volume, the essays on "Ontology and Mind" shows a somewhat similar uneven character and quality as in the previous part. Uriah Kriegel's paper on "Brentano's Concept of Mind" is an interesting piece, reconstructing Brentano's philosophy of mind with the tools of analytic philosophy. Brentano is still underappreciated among contemporary analytic philosophers, and Kriegel does his best to sell us Brentano's system. He also compares the rationally reconstructed views of Brentano to some contemporary views (using the vocabulary of natural kinds and reference-fixing). Thus the paper's innovation is that it brings back to the table an option and a figure that was long-neglected and perhaps "much more faithful to the folk's spontaneous, natural conception of mentality" (223) than others.

Kris McDaniel also tries to rehabilitate a historical figure; his choice is Susanne Langer, who was indeed a strange figure in the history and current reception of analytic philosophy. While she seems to be one of the early analytically minded logicians (considered in a positive light even by logical empiricists in the 1930s), and wrote like nine books and numerous articles (p.266), she is simply left out from almost all of the mainstream historical works and narratives of analytic philosophy. McDaniel's approach thus may resolve some tension and fill in some gaps in our story of where we came from. What we get after all is much more like of shopping list from which anyone can choose his favorite contemporary topic: events, forms, facts, and propositions. McDaniel is somewhat lucky since he was able to pick up such a figure whose favorite topics and whose underlying philosophical approach is similar to many of the contemporary interests. From that perspective, it is indeed fertilizing to see Langer's major thoughts reconstructed. The paper's main innovation is, however, its methodological black line: "[w]e mismeasure the size of an ocean if we look only at the big fish in it" (p. 267).

The most appealing paper in Part III is Alexander Klein's article on Russell and William James. The author aims at the deconstruction of the well-known metaphysical reading of Russell's external-world program, by pursuing a much more nuanced, epistemologically motivated story that relied substantially on James's empirical psychology. Though Russell is among the most discussed philosophers of analytic philosophy, and there hardly seem to be any more layers that could be ripped off from him, Klein is quite innovative in producing an interesting and stimulating story of a new reading.

The fourth and thus last part of the collection is devoted to mathematics, consisting of two papers: one about Russell's logicism (Jeremy Heis) and one about the history of algebra (Audrey Pap). Heis discusses in the question that "what changes would have to be made to arrive at logicism" (304) from Russell's 1897 viewpoint (i.e. what innovations had to be made) when he wrote his treatise on geometry. Pap, on the other hand, traces the influence-lines of algebra and the philosophy of mathematics: she considers the ideas of Richard Dedeking, and Emmy Noether and argues for two distinct theses. First that, these

mathematicians have a role to play in the history of analytic philosophy, and secondly that Noether has invented such tools and conceptions that were quite original in her own context, and that might play an important role in our current debates about structuralism, which seems to be the new favorite topic and "ism" among logicians and philosophers of mathematics.

All in all, the volume has some really interesting and important studies about the history of analytic philosophy, some really promising figures and subjects for further historical and problematic-oriented studies, and some quite general and abstract discussion, not utilizing the inherent possibilities of a topic. Nonetheless, unfortunately, it is hardly distinguishable from any contemporary volume about the history of analytic philosophy: while analytic philosophy was considered to be by many a real innovation in the history of philosophy in general, the volume presents this only partially.

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